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In this study, we found that NYSE and AMEX firms have somewhat different capital structures.  
NYSE firms generally use 5% to 8% more debt financing in their capital structures than AMEX 
firms.  It was also found that the amount of debt in the capital structures of AMEX firms declined 
somewhat between 1985 and 2003 but remained relatively stable for NYSE firms.  Also, NYSE firms 
were found to exhibit a strong inverse relationship between firm profitability and the amount on 
debt in the firm’s capital structure.  This result is generally consistent with Myers and Majluf’s 
“asymmetric information theory” of capital structure.  No relationship was found between 
profitability and capital structure for AMEX firms.  Comparison of these results to similar 
calculations found in Fosberg and Ghosh (2005) for NASDAQ firms shows that, like AMEX firms, 
NASDAQ firms use less debt in their capital structures than NYSE firms and exhibit no relationship 
between profitability and capital structure.  Consequently, because these anomalies exist for both 





n a recent study, Fama and French (2001) showed that over the last twenty or so years a large number of 
companies have stopped paying dividends to their common stockholders’.  Specifically, in 1978 66.5% of  
publicly traded firms paid dividends but by 1999 only 20.8% of such firms paid dividends.  In analyzing 
their data, Fama and French conclude that part of the reason for the declining dividend payments has been a general 
reduction in the propensity of firms to pay dividends.  One possible explanation for this reduction in the propensity to 
pay is that firms have decided to rely more on internally generated funds to finance their investment opportunities than 
they have in the past.  Formally, this is the “pecking order theory” of firm capital structure suggested by Myers (1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984).  Assuming the “pecking order theory” is the correct explanation of the dividend 
reductions firms will, among other things, also be using less debt capital to finance their investments than they have in 
the past.  Fosberg and Ghosh (2005) tested this theory on a large sample of NYSE and NASDAQ firms and found that 
there had been a significant reduction in the amount of debt in the capital structures of NASDAQ firms over the last 
twenty years.  NYSE firms did not exhibit any noticeable changes in capital structure over the period.  At this point it 
is unclear if this difference in capital structure changes is due to firm size, exchange listing, or some other factor.  
Additionally, Fosberg and Ghosh found that there is a significant inverse relationship between firm profitability and 
the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure for NYSE firms, but not for NASDAQ firms. 
 
In this study, we seek to extend previous research by ascertaining if the capital structure and profitability 
effects noted above extend to firms listed on the AMEX as well.  We will also seek to determine what factors are 
causing these profitability and capital structure effects.   
 
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Our base sample is all firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX stock markets that are reported on the 
COMPUSTAT data base (10-29-04 version).  Firms in the utilities and financial services industries were eliminated 
from the base sample because of the potential biases associated with the heavy regulation of those industries.  
Companies with negative net worths in any sample year were also eliminated from the base sample because of the 
I 
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distorted capital structures of these firms.  Outliers, firms with return on assets of more than 100% or less than -100% 
in any sample year, were also eliminated from the base sample.  This resulted in a final sample of 1022 NYSE and 
244 AMEX firms.  Data for each sample company for the sample years 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2003 was 
obtained from COMPUSTAT.  Some companies did not have data for every sample year.  Data for NASDAQ firms 
cited in this study came from Fosberg and Ghosh (2005).  Previous studies such as Friend and Lang (1988) and 
Berger, Ofek , and Yermack (1997) have shown that the amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure is affected by a 
number of factors including primarily firm size, risk, collateral availability, and growth opportunities.  We will control 
for all of these factors in our analysis.  Our firm size proxies are total assets (Assets), sales (Sales), and the market 
value of common equity (MVE).  Collateral availability is measure by the firm’s net property, plant, and equipment to 
total assets ratio (PPE).  Growth opportunities are measured by the market to book value of common equity 
(MVE/BE) and Tobin’s q.  Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the book values of debt and preferred equity plus the 
market value of common equity divided by the sum of the book values of debt, preferred, and common equity.  
 
There are two well known theories that seek to explain the relationship between profitability and the amount 
of debt in a firm’s capital structure.  Jensen (1986) believes that greater profitability should result in more debt usage 
by firms in order to control the agency costs associated with free cash flow.  Specifically, the increased  debt service 
requirements caused by additional debt will force managers to pay out more of the firm’s free cash flows to creditors 
and leave less money for managers to use for things that do not benefit the firm’s shareholders.  Jensen’s theory 
implies a direct relationship profitability and the amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure.  Myers and Majluf 
(1984), however, argue that if there is asymmetric information in the capital markets, new security issues (debt and 
equity) will be undervalued by investors and the firm will be better off financing its investments with internally 
generated funds.  Firms will, therefore, only finance with outside debt capital when internally generated funds are 
insufficient to fully fund the firm’s investment opportunities.  Myers and Majluf’s theory implies an inverse 
relationship between profitability and the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure.  Our empirical analysis should 
indicate which of these two theories is correct.  Additionally, we will test to see if the relationship between firm 
profitability and the amount of debt in the typical firm’s capital structure has changed over the last twenty years.  
Profitability is measured by sample year return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and operating cash flow 
divided by total assets (CF/Assets).  Firm risk is measured by the standard deviation of ROA, ROE, and CF/Assets 




 The mean values of selected variables for the AMEX sample firms for each of the sample years are presented 
in Table 1.  Looking first at the size proxies, it is evident that the average size of AMEX firms grew only slightly over 
the sample period.  For example, mean Assets grew from $254 million in 1985 to only $318 million in 2003.  Also, 
there is a decrease in the amount of debt in the AMEX firms’ capital structures over the sample period.  The mean 
total debt to total assets ratio(Debt/Assets) declined from .208 in 1985 to .174 in 2003.  Similarly, the mean total debt 
to total capital ratio (Debt/T. Cap.) dropped from .269 in 1985 to .232 in 2003.  Total capital is the sum of the book 
values of debt, preferred, and common equity.  Interestingly, firm profitability has also decreased over the sample 
period.  Mean ROA for the sample firms dropped from .049 (4.9%) in 1985 to -.045 in 2003.  Similar decreases in 
ROE and CF/Assets are also evident.  The data shows that AMEX firms’ growth opportunities have increased over 
time as both mean MVE/BE and Tobin’s q have risen over the sample period.  Mean PPE increased from .274 in 1985 
to .290 in 2003, indicating that AMEX firms have slightly more collateral available to pledge on debt than they used 
to. 
 
 NYSE firms display many, but not all, of the trends exhibited by AMEX firms (see Table 2).  For example, 
mean Assets grew substantially over the sample period from $2,463 million in 1985 to $8,678 million in 2003.  Also, 
comparing mean Assets figures, it is evident that the average NYSE firm is more than ten times larger than the 
average AMEX firm.  The mean profitability of the NYSE firms has also declined over the sample period.  For 
example, mean ROA declined from .060 (6.0%) in 1985 to .042 in 2003.  Other profitability measures exhibit a 
similar trend.  Growth opportunities for NYSE firms have also increased as indicated by the increase in MVE/BE 
from 2.18 in 1985 to 2.69 in 2003.  There has also been a slight decline in collateral availability (PPE) in recent years.  
The one trend that is different for NYSE firms relates to their capital structures.  Examining the Debt/Assets ratio, the 
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decrease in the amount debt in AMEX firms’ capital structures is not evident for NYSE firms.  In fact, there is no 
discernible trend in the capital structures of NYSE firms.  However, the typical NYSE firm has, on average, more debt 
in its capital structure in each sample year than the average AMEX firm (5% more over the last decade). 
 
 Our next objective is to test for the relationship, if any, between firm profitability and capital structure and to 
see if this relationship has changed over time.  This will be accomplished with a regression analysis in the which the 
firm’s Debt/Assets ratio is used as the dependent variable.  A separate regression will be run for each sample year.  In 
each regression, control variables for firm size, collateral, growth opportunities, and risk will be employed.   
 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Selected Variables for the AMEX Firms 
 
Panel A:  Firm Size 
 
    1985        1989        1994        1999        2003  
 
Assets ($M)    254          364          607           320          318 
Sales ($M)    269          313          296           328          361 
MVE ($M)    196          358          200           199          355 
 
 
Panel B:  Capital Structure 
 
Debt ($M)      53           97            78           104          103 
Debt/Assets   .208        .237         .194          .228         .174 
Debt/T. Cap.   .269        .301         .256          .299         .232   
 
 
Panel C:  Profitability, Growth, etc. 
 
ROA     .049        .021         .013         -.009        -.045 
ROE     .076        .036         .032          .002        -.067 
CF/Assets    .126        .098         .088          .051         .012 
MVE/BE   2.41        1.86         2.00          3.01         3.26 
Tobin’s q   1.09        1.61         1.77          2.71         3.00 
PPE    .274        .300         .313          .315         .290 
 
M = million 
 
 
The main independent variables of interest are profitability measures (ROA and Avg. ROA).  ROA measures current 
year profitability while Avg. ROA (average annual ROA over years t to t - 4) measures long-term profitability.  In 
Table 3, the results of the regressions for AMEX firms are presented.  In these regressions, firm size (Assets) is 
weakly correlated with the amount of debt in the sample firms’ capital structures.  In four of the sample year 
regressions, the coefficient of Assets is positive but not significant at conventional levels.  Collateral availability is 
shown to be a significant determinant of firm capital structure.  The coefficients of PPE are all positive and two are 
significant at the 10% level or better.  Four of the coefficients of Tobin’s q are negative and three of these are 
significant at the 10% level or better.  This indicates that high growth firms tend to use less debt in their capital 
structures than low growth firms.  Firm risk does not seem to be an important determinant of firm capital structure as 
the coefficients of Std. ROA do not have a consistent sign.  The relationship between firm profitability and capital 
structure is also weak, at best.  Looking at current year’s profitability (ROA), only one coefficient is statistically 
significant at conventional levels and the signs of the coefficients are not consistent.  For long-term profitability (Avg. 
ROA), the coefficients are again inconsistent in their signs.  In sum, these results indicate there is little or no 
relationship between firm profitability and the amount of debt in AMEX firms’ capital structures. 
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 Other dependent and control variables were also tried in the above regressions (not shown).  Sales and MVE 
were tried as size proxies and ROE and CF/Assets were used as profitability measures.  Additionally, MVE/BE was 
employed as a growth proxy and Debt/T. Cap. was substituted as the capital structure proxy.  None of these variables 
improved on the explanatory power of the regressions reported above. 
 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Selected Variables for the NYSE Firms 
 
Panel A:  Firm Size 
 
    1985        1989        1994        1999        2003  
 
Assets ($M)   2463        4075        4767        6247        8678 
Sales ($M)   2830       3759        4297         5450        7163 
MVE ($M)   1868       2808        3508         9074        8416 
 
 
Panel B:  Capital Structure 
 
Debt ($M)    536       1355         1399         1929        2571 
Debt/Assets   .215       .251          .230          .269         .239 
Debt/T. Cap.   .296       .346          .327          .373         .344 
 
 
Panel C:  Profitability, Growth, etc. 
 
ROA     .060       .062          .062          .054         .042 
ROE     .115       .128          .131          .127         .092 
CF/Assets    .164       .160          .161          .153         .133 
MVE/BE   2.18       2.30          2.55          3.16         2.69 
Tobin’s q   1.88       1.89          2.08          2.42         2.08 
PPE    .368       .368          .374          .356         .338 
 
M = million 
 
 
 Table 4 contains the results of a similar regression analysis performed on NYSE firms.  Four of the 
coefficients of Assets are positive and significant at the 5% level or better.  Also, the coefficients of PPE are all 
positive and four are significant at the 5% level or better.  The coefficients of Tobin’s q are all negative and significant 
at the 1% level.  For Std. ROA, the coefficients are all negative and four are significant at the 1% level.  These results 
are much stronger for the NYSE firms than they were for the AMEX firms.  In general, these regressions indicate that 
there are strong relationships between firm size (direct), collateral availability (direct), growth opportunities (inverse), 
and firm risk (inverse) and the amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure for NYSE firms.  Another significant 
difference between the two sets of regressions relates to firm profitability.  While there was little or no relationship 
between profitability and capital structure for AMEX firms, there is a strong inverse relationship for NYSE firms.  For 
NYSE firms, four of the coefficients of ROA are negative and significant at the 1% level.  For Avg. ROA, the 
coefficients are all negative and three are significant at the 1% level.  These results indicate that the amount of debt in 
NYSE firms’ capital structures is inversely related to both current and long-term profitability.  This result is consistent 
with Myers and Majluf’s “asymmetric information theory” of capital structure. 
 
 To this point, two of the main results of this study are that NYSE firms have more debt in their capital 
structures than AMEX firms and that profitability and capital structure are inversely related for NYSE firms but not 
for AMEX firms.  These findings will be further tested in a regression analysis in which both NYSE and AMEX firms 
are included in each sample year’s regression.  This will allow us to test for the statistical significance of the above 
findings.  This will require that two new independent variables be employed.  The first is NasdD, a dummy variable 
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that takes on a value of one if the sample firm is a AMEX firm and zero otherwise.  The coefficient of this dummy 
variable will indicate whether there is a difference in the amount of debt in the capital structures of the two  
 
 
Table 3:  Regression Analysis of Capital Structure for AMEX Firms 
 
       1985          1989          1994          1999          2003  
  
 
Intercept                  .237c          .344c          .216c        .248c          .170c 
   (t value)     (4.68)          (6.88)         (5.53)       (7.25)         (8.19) 
 
Assets (104)     .014            .015          -.013          .071            .080 
     (0.13)          (0.18)       (-0.48)        (1.03)         (1.64) 
 
PPE      .051            .018           .136a        .025            .149c 
     (0.49)          (0.18)        (1.72)        (0.41)         (3.16) 
 
Tobin’s q    -.001            .001          -.019a       -.018c        -.014c 
                   (-0.06)         (0.03)       (-1.83)       (-3.14)        (-4.28) 
 
ROA     -1.76c         -.435            .215          .278          -.048 
    (-5.30)    (-1.32)         (1.15)      (-1.06)        (-0.49) 
 
Avg. ROA     .889b          -.900b       -.503a        -.344          .052 
     (2.19)         (-2.10)       (-1.77)       (-1.39)       (0.53) 
  
Std. ROA     .246            -1.62c        -.498b        .096           .032 
     (0.45)         (-3.24)       (-2.01)        (0.44)        (0.46) 
 
Adj. R2      .23               .12              .08            .04             .13 
 
F value     5.30c       3.20c          2.65b        2.14a         6.29c 
 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
groups of firms.  The second new variable is ROA∙NasdD (ROA multiplied by NasdD), an interactive dummy 
variable that will indicate whether there is a difference in the relationship between profitability and firm capital 
structure for the two groups of sample firms.  The results of these regressions are presented in Table 5.  The 
coefficients of Assets, PPE, Tobin’s q, Std. ROA, ROA, and Avg. ROA are similar to those reported previously in 
Table 4.  The coefficient of NasdD is negative in four years and three of those are significant at the 1% level.  This 
indicates that, on average, AMEX firms use less debt in their capital structures than NYSE firms.  The coefficients 
show that after controlling for firm size, profitability, etc. AMEX firms have averaged 5% to 8% less debt in their 
capital structures than NYSE firms over the last decade.  Four of the coefficients of ROA∙NasdD are positive and 
three of those are significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
relationship between profitability and capital structure for the two groups of sample firms.  The coefficient of ROA 
shows this relationship for NYSE firms and indicates a statistically significant inverse relationship between 
profitability and capital structure in all sample years.  The sum of the coefficients of ROA and ROA∙NasdD shows the 
relationship between profitability and capital structure for AMEX firms.  For example, for 2003 the sum of the 
coefficients is .137 (-.178 + .315).  Since .137 is not statistically significant at conventional levels ( t =  0.95), this 
means that there is no relationship between profitability and capital structure for AMEX firms in 2003.  Overall, the 
sum of the coefficients is positive in the last three sample years (one is significant) and negative in the first two 
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sample years (both are significant).  In sum, the erratic signs of the coefficient sums indicate there is no consistent 
relationship between profitability and capital structure for AMEX firms. 
 
 
Table 4:  Regression Analysis of Capital Structure for NYSE Firms 
 
        1985          1989          1994          1999           2003  
 
 
Intercept                     .262c         .339c         .298c          .321c         .298c 
   (t value)        (14.5)        (18.5)        (19.4)         (25.8)         (25.2) 
 
Assets (104)    -.010          .013c         .008b          .005b         .004c 
     (-1.18)       (3.00)         (2.55)         (2.18)         (3.33) 
 
PPE      .127c         .049           .059b          .092c         .107c 
      (3.77)        (1.58)        (2.41)          (4.26)        (5.59) 
 
Tobin’s q     -.017c       -.020c        -.018c         -.010c       -.020c 
     (-2.86)      (-2.71)       (-3.11)        (-5.17)       (-4.98) 
 
ROA      -.472c       -.862c        -.628c         -.317c         .006 
     (-3.28)      (-5.33)       (-4.57)        (-2.82)        (0.06) 
 
Avg. ROA     -.272         -.029         -.354c         -.647c        -.728c 
     (-1.35)      (-0.16)       (-2.73)        (-5.47)       (-5.64) 
 
Std. ROA     -.683c       -.768c        -.071           -.356c       -.793c 
     (-3.45)      (-4.06)       (-0.53)         (-3.14)      (-6.07) 
 
Adj. R2                    .21            .24             .24               .21             .19 
 
F value     21.7c         28.5c          34.7c          38.6c         37.9c 
 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 Fosberg and Ghosh (2005) did an analysis of NASDAQ firms for the same sample years used in this study 
and found results similar to those that we report for AMEX firms.  For example, NASDAQ firms have mean Assets 
over the sample years of $574 million versus $373 million for AMEX firms.  Thus, AMEX and NASDAQ firms are 
of approximately the same size whereas NYSE firms are much larger (mean Assets of $5,246 million).  NASDAQ 
firms also experience a similar decline in the amount of debt in their capital structures (from Debt/Assets of .204 in 
1985 to .141 in 2003) as noted above for AMEX firms.  Also, NASDAQ firms are found to exhibit no relationship 
between firm profitability and the amount of debt in their capital structures.  The similarity of these results suggests 
several implications.  First, the lack of a relationship between profitability and capital structure is not an exchange 
listing phenomenon as it is apparent for both NASDAQ and AMEX firms.  Similarly, the lower debt usage by both 
NASDAQ and AMEX firms can not be an exchange listing phenomenon.  This results of this study do not suggest 




 In this study, we found that NYSE and AMEX firms have somewhat different capital structures.  NYSE 
firms generally use 5% to 8% more debt financing in their capital structures than AMEX firms.  It was also found that 
the amount of debt in the capital structures of AMEX firms declined somewhat between 1985 and 2003 but remained 
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relatively stable for NYSE firms.  Also, NYSE firms were found to exhibit a strong inverse relationship between firm 
profitability and the amount on debt in the firm’s capital structure.   
 
 
Table 5:  Regression Analysis of Capital Structure for AMEX and NYSE Firms 
 
     1985          1989           1994          1999          2003  
 
 
Intercept                      .251c          .340c          .300c         .320c         .255c 
   (t value)     (14.2)         (19.0)         (22.6)         (25.7)        (25.5) 
 
Assets (104)    -.008            .013c         .007b         .005b          .005c 
    (-0.91)         (2.85)         (2.23)        (2.27)         (3.53) 
 
PPE      .110c          .042            .072c         .077c          .119c 
     (3.54)         (1.38)         (3.04)        (3.73)         (6.54) 
 
Tobin’s q    -.013c    -.011a        -.019c        -.012c        -.019c 
    (-2.64)       (-1.79)       (-3.84)        (-6.50)       (-8.36) 
 
NasdD      .031          -.029          -.084c        -.077c        -.048c 
     (1.61)        (-1.55)       (-5.30)       (-5.42)       (-4.04) 
 
ROA      -.658c        -.786c        -.680c        -.355c        -.178b 
    (-4.85)       (-4.83)       (-5.36)       (-3.22)        (-2.14) 
 
ROA∙NasdD    -.595b         .174           .785c         .743c          .315c 
     (3.92)         (0.80)        (5.26)        (5.71)         (3.15) 
 
Avg. ROA     -.032         -.315b       -.283c        -.517c         -.229c 
    (-2.02)        (-1.97)      (-2.84)       (-5.21)        (-3.28) 
 
Std. ROA   -.556c        -.922c       -.269c         -.206b        -.167c 
    (-3.01)       (-5.17)      (-2.84)         (-2.13)       (-3.37) 
 
Adj. R2           .21             .21             .21              .17             .16 
 
F value      18.7c         21.7c         26.9c          27.3c         29.0c 
 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
This result is generally consistent with Myers and Majluf’s “asymmetric information theory” of capital structure.  No 
relationship was found between profitability and capital structure for AMEX firms.  Comparison of these results to 
similar calculations found in Fosberg and Ghosh (2005) for NASDAQ firms shows that, like AMEX firms, NASDAQ 
firms use less debt in their capital structures than NYSE firms and exhibit no relationship between profitability and 
capital structure.  Consequently, because these anomalies exist for both AMEX and NASDAQ firms, these two 
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